Competitive Equilibria with Production and Limited Commitment by Arpad Abraham & Eva Carceles-Poveda
Competitive Equilibria with Production and Limited Commitment∗
Árpád Ábrahám†and Eva Cárceles-Poveda‡
March 9, 2009
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uncertainty where consumers have limited commitment on their ﬁnancial liabil-
ities. Markets are endogenously incomplete due to the fact that the borrowing
constraints are determined endogenously. We ﬁrst show that, if competitive ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries are allowed to set the borrowing limits, then the ones that
prevent default will be an equilibrium outcome. The equilibrium allocations in
this economy are not constrained eﬃcient due to the fact that intermediaries do
not internalize the adverse eﬀects of capital on default incentives. We also iso-
late and quantiﬁy this new source of ineﬃciency by comparing the competitive
equilibrium allocations to the constrained eﬃcient ones both qualitatively and
quantitatively. We tend to observe higher capital accumulation in the competi-
tive equilibrium, implying that agents may enjoy higher (average) welfare in the
long run than in the constrained eﬃcient allocation.
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11. Introduction
This paper studies a production economy with aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty
in which consumers have limited commitment on their ﬁnancial liabilities. Even though
households can trade in a complete set of state contingent claims, markets are endoge-
nously incomplete due to the presence of endogenous borrowing limits, which are
determined at the level which makes agents indiﬀerent between repaying their debt or
going into ﬁnancial autarky.
An environment with complete ﬁnancial markets and endogenous borrowing con-
straints was ﬁrst studied by Alvarez and Jermann (2000). Apart from the fact that
the previous authors only analyze endowment economies, neither their model nor the
subsequent literature has provided micro foundations for how the endogenous limits
arise in equilibrium. In the present paper, we do this by introducing a ﬁnancial inter-
mediation sector with two distinct roles. First, it intermediates between households
and the representative ﬁrm by collecting funds from the household sector, transforming
it into capital and renting it to the production sector. Second, it is allowed to set the
borrowing constraints on households, a new feature that has the following important
consequence. Regardless of whether the framework is a production or an endowment
economy, competition in the intermediation sector implies that the endogenous bor-
rowing constraints which (just) prevent default arise as a (Nash) equilibrium outcome
when intermediaries are allowed to set them. Moreover, if the limits are binding in
equilibrium, they constitute the unique (Nash) equilibrium outcome. One attractive
f e a t u r eo ft h i sr e s u l ti st h a tt h e s el i m i t sd on o tr e q u i r ea n yg o v e r n m e n t a li n t e r v e n t i o n
and, in this sense, are self-enforcing. We consider this an important contribution of
the present paper.
One of the key questions analyzed in the literature with complete markets and
limited commitment is whether a market arrangement with endogenous borrowing
constraints that prevent default in equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient. In endow-
ment economies, Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that this is the case. However,
in economies with endogenous production and ﬁnancial intermediaries, Ábrahám and
Cárceles-Poveda (2006) show that the equilibrium with endogenous borrowing con-
straints is ineﬃc i e n td u et ot h ef a c tt h a tt h ev a l u eo fa u t a r k ya n dt h u st h ei n c e n t i v e s
to default depend on the aggregate capital stock. In addition, the authors show that a
decentralization of the constrained eﬃcient allocations as competitive equilibria with
endogenous borrowing limits becomes possible if one also imposes an upper limit on
the intermediaries’ capital holdings.1 Since the intermediaries in our economy are not
subject to accumulation constraints, it becomes clear that the equilibrium concept
studied in the present paper is not constrained eﬃcient. In spite of this, several im-
1In a similar economy, a diﬀerent decentralization with capital income taxes is provided by Chien
and Lee (2005). Moreover, Kehoe and Perri (2002b and 2004) provide another decentralization of the
constrained eﬃcient economies in a two sector model in which agents are interpreted as countries.
2portant reasons provide us with a strong motivation for studying such an equilibrium.
First, we are not aware of any empirical evidence on capital accumulation constraints
in the data. Second, if intermediaries are subject to accumulation constraints, we show
that the endogenous borrowing constraints that just prevent default cannot arise as an
equilibrium outcome. The main reason is that intermediaries typically make strictly
positive proﬁts in the presence of accumulation constraints, and this is not compatible
with perfect competition and free entry. Last, several authors have studied compet-
itive equilibria with production and endogenous borrowing limits that just prevent
default for quantitative analysis (see for example Cordoba (2008) and Krueger and
Perri (2006)). These papers, however, do not discuss the sustainability of these limits
or the relationship between these equilibria and the constrained eﬃcient allocations.
In the present paper, we provide a characterization of the equilibrium in these
non-optimal economies that has the following important implications. First, while the
computation of competitive equilibria is potentially very demanding, we show that the
equilibrium allocations solve almost the same system of equations as the constrained
eﬃcient ones. This implies that computing our more empirically plausible competi-
tive equilibrium does not require any extra burden as compared to the relatively easy
computation of the constrained eﬃcient solution. Second, our characterization iso-
lates a particular form of ineﬃciency of limited commitment models that only arises
with (endogenous) capital accumulation. As mentioned earlier, this occurs because the
value of autarky is positively related to the aggregate capital stock through the de-
pendence of wages (which are the only source of income during autarky) on aggregate
capital. This eﬀect cannot be internalized by the endogenous borrowing constraints
alone and it is always present whenever the participation (borrowing) constraints are
binding for some agent. Third, the proof of the characterization result establishes
that the competitive equilibrium allocation we study is equivalent to the equilibrium
studied by Kehoe and Levine (1993). This equilibrium concept assumes that agents
trade in state-contingent claims at period zero, while their consumption plans have to
satisfy participation constraints for every future contingency. Since our equilibrium
is ineﬃcient, an important consequence of this is that a Kehoe-Levine equilibrium is
ineﬃcient in production economies as well.
After characterizing the competitive equilibrium, the paper compares quantita-
tively the allocations to the constrained eﬃcient ones in a framework that directly
extends the economies studied by Thomas and Worrall (1988), Kocherlakota (1996)
and Alvarez and Jermann (2001) to endogenous production. These authors analyze
endowment economies with limited commitment and two types of agents that are
subject to negatively correlated idiosyncratic income shocks. These assumptions are
particularly attractive for illustrating the diﬀerent eﬀects of limited commitment in
the presence of endogenous production, since it is relatively easy to study the eﬀect of
aggregate shocks and compute the transition dynamics. Further, this exercise is crit-
3ical for exploring the qualitative and quantitative eﬀects of the fact that the autarky
eﬀects are not internalized.2
One of our main ﬁndings is that the diﬀerence between the equilibrium and con-
strained eﬃcient allocation is in general relatively small. In particular, we ﬁnd that
the two economies exhibit perfect risk sharing in the long run with the benchmark cal-
ibration, assuming standard values for the capital share and impatience level. These
results are in line with Cordoba (2008) and Krueger and Perri (2006), who both ﬁnd
extensive risk sharing in models with capital accumulation and endogenous borrowing
limits.3 In addition to this, we ﬁnd that important diﬀerences between the constrained
eﬃcient and the equilibrium allocations arise in the short run. First, as expected, the
competitive equilibrium accumulates more capital because of the adverse eﬀect of cap-
ital on default incentives, which is not internalized by intermediaries. Second, for the
same reason, the constrained eﬃcient economy has a bigger range of initial wealth
distributions under which full risk sharing is supported. Finally, a more surprising re-
sult is that, although agents can enjoy more risk sharing in the constrained eﬃcient
allocation, the fact that capital accumulation is lower (either only along the transition
or also in the long run with our alternative parametrization) aﬀects their future utility
negatively. We ﬁnd that this last eﬀect dominates for the more wealthy agents, since
less risk sharing reduces their utility to a smaller extent. Given this, the allocation of
the (ineﬃcient) competitive equilibrium is not Pareto dominated by the constrained
eﬃcient allocation.
Next, we study the sensitivity of our results to alternative model formulations.
First, we modify the autarky penalties by allowing agents to save in physical capital
after default. This modiﬁcation can potentially have important qualitative implica-
tions as, in this case, higher capital does not necessarily increase the value of autarky.
Even though it increases wages, it also reduces the interest rate. Nevertheless, none
of the qualitative ﬁndings described above are altered, although less risk sharing is
obviously supported in this case. This also implies that the interest rate eﬀect is
quantitatively less important than the wage eﬀect. Second, we choose a diﬀerent cali-
bration assuming that agents are more impatient and a lower weight of capital income
in their total income. In contrast with the benchmark case, this parametrization,
which is more similar to the one used by Alvarez and Jermann (2001), implies that the
long run equilibrium allocations are not characterized by perfect risk sharing. As in
exchange economies, this result shows that the extent of long run risk sharing depends
2Similar results can be obtained in empirically more plausible settings with a continuum of types.
However, the study of transitional dynamics and/or aggregate shocks in such an environment would
require signiﬁcantly higher computational costs.
3On the other hand, our quantitative results are in contrast to the ﬁndings of the two country
economy with capital accumulation and limited commitment studied by Kehoe and Perri (2002a),
where imperfect risk sharing arises in the long run. Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda (2006) discuss in
detail the key diﬀerences between the two setups.
4crucially on the calibration. In particular, there always exists a level of patience above
which perfect risk sharing is the long run outcome. Finally, we ﬁnd that the short
run diﬀerences that we have described above also hold in the long run. In particular,
capital accumulation in the stationary distribution tends to be higher in the competi-
tive equilibrium. More surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the competitive equilibrium actually
experiences a higher expected (average) welfare in the stationary distribution due to
the higher aggregate capital.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model economy and
describes the constrained eﬃcient allocations. Section 3 discusses and characterizes the
competitive equilibrium with endogenous borrowing limits and ﬁnancial intermediaries.
In addition, Section 4 compares the competitive equilibria to the constrained eﬃcient
allocations quantitatively and Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2. The Economy
We consider an inﬁnite horizon economy with production, aggregate uncertainty, idio-
syncratic risk and participation constraints. These constraints assume that the contin-
uation utility derived from any allocation has to be at least as high as the continuation
utility from the outside option, which is assumed to be ﬁnancial autarky.4
Time is discrete and indexed by t =0 ,1,2.... Further, the resolution of uncertainty
is represented by an information structure or event-tree N.E a c hn o d est ∈ N,s u m -
marizing the history until date t,h a saﬁnite number of immediate successors, denoted
by st+1|st. W eu s et h en o t a t i o nsr|st with r ≥ t to indicate that node sr belongs to
t h es u b - t r e ew i t hr o o tst. Further, with the exception of the unique root node s0 at
t =0 , each node has a unique predecessor, denoted by st−1. The probability of st as of
period 0 is denoted by π(st),w i t hπ(s0)=1 .M o r e o v e r ,π(sr|st) represents the condi-
tional probability of sr given st. For notational convenience, we let {x} = {x(st)}st∈N
represent the entire state-contingent sequence of any variable x throughout the paper.
The economy is populated by a ﬁnite number of agent types that are indexed by
i ∈ I, with a continuum of identical consumers within each type. Households have

























where β ∈ (0,1) i st h es u b j e c t i v ed i s c o u n tf a c t o ra n dE0 denotes the expectation
conditional on information at date t =0 . The period utility function u is strictly
increasing, strictly concave, unbounded below and continuously diﬀerentiable, with
limc→0 u0(c)=∞ and limc→∞ u0(c)=0 .
4Our model extends the economies in Kocherlakota (1996) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000) to a
context with endogenous production.
5At each date-state st, households are subject to a stochastic labour endowment
 i(st) that follows a stationary Markov chain with N  possible values. Households
supply labor inelastically and the sum of their labour endowments is equal to the
aggregate labor supply L(st)=
P
i∈I  i(st) ∈ R++. Each period, households are also












) for all i ∈ I and s
t, (2)
where V (Si (st)) is the outside option, Si (st)=(  i(st); −i(st),z(st),K(st−1)), K (st) ∈
R++ is the aggregate capital stock and  −i =(  i)i∈I\i.
At each node st, a single consumption good y(st) ∈ R+ is produced with aggregate






where z(st) ∈ R++ is a productivity shock that follows a stationary Markov chain with
Nz possible values. Given z, the production function f(z,·,·):R2
+ → R+ is assumed to
be continuously diﬀerentiable on the interior of its domain, strictly increasing, strictly
concave in K, and homogeneous of degree one in the two arguments. Moreover, we
assume that fLK(z,K,L) > 0, limK→0 fK(z,K,L)=∞ and limK→∞fK(z,K,L)=0
for all K>0 and L>0. Capital depreciates at a constant rate δ and we deﬁne total





















2.1. Constrained Eﬃcient Allocations. The constrained eﬃcient allocations of
the economy described above are characterized in detail by Ábrahám and Cárceles-
Poveda (2006). We therefore just provide the ﬁrst-order conditions below.5 The ﬁrst









t and i,j ∈ I. (6)
where vi is a non-negative multiplier thatis strictly positive only if the participation
constraint of type i is binding. As usual in models with endogenously incomplete
5The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are only necessary but not suﬃcient in general. For
a detailed discussion of this issue see Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda (2006). A later section that
presents the numerical results discusses further how to obtain these conditions.
6markets, condition (6) implies that the relative consumption of any two types is deter-
mined by the ratio of their time varying Pareto weights, which is represented by the
right hand side of the previous equation. The optimality condition that determines

































for any i ∈ I and for all s
t.
where the terms FK and VK represent the derivatives of total output F and of the
outside option value V with respect to the aggregate capital K.A sr e ﬂected by con-
dition (7), the presence of binding enforcement constraints introduces two additional
eﬀects on the inter-temporal allocation of consumption and capital. First, it increases
the planner’s marginal rate of substitution between period t and t+1goods, an eﬀect
that is reﬂected by t h ep r e s e n c eo f vi (st+1) on the right hand side of the equation.
Second, it increases the value of ﬁnancial autarky, an eﬀect that is reﬂected by the
autarky eﬀects VK on the second part of the right hand side of the equation.
3. Competitive Equilibria
This section extends two diﬀerent competitive equilibrium concepts to a context with
endogenous production. Both types of equilibria have been shown to decentralize the
constrained eﬃcient allocations with participation constraints and ﬁnancial autarky
as an outside option in exchange economies. The ﬁrst one was proposed by Alvarez
and Jermann (2000) and the second one by Kehoe and Levine (1993). Whereas the
equilibrium proposed by Alvarez and Jermann assumes sequential trade in one period
ahead contingent claims subject to endogenous solvency constraints, the equilibrium
proposed by Kehoe and Levine imposes the participation constraints as direct restric-
tions on the consumption possibility sets of consumers. In addition, it assumes an
Arrow Debreu market structure with trade at period zero.
In the two settings, we assume that the economy is populated by a representative
ﬁrm that operates the production technology and by a risk neutral and competitive
ﬁnancial intermediation sector that operates the investment technology. Since we will
consider only symmetric equilibria where all intermediaries hold the same portfolio,
we focus on the representative intermediary.
3.1. Competitive Equilibrium with Solvency Constraints. This section de-
ﬁnes a competitive equilibrium with complete markets and endogenous borrowing lim-
its in the spirit of Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
Each period, the representative ﬁrm rents labor from the households and physical





























The representative intermediary lives for two periods.6 An intermediary that is
born at node st ﬁrst decides how much capital k(st) to purchase. The capital is
rented to the ﬁrm, earning a rental revenue of r(st+1)k(st) and a liquidation value of
(1 − δ)k(st) the following period. To ﬁnance the capital purchases, the intermediary
sells the future consumption goods in the spot market for one period ahead contingent
































At each st, households can trade in a complete set of state contingent claims to

















































Equation (11) is the budget constraint, where ai(st+1) is the amount of state con-
tingent claims held by i ∈ I at the end of period t. Note that market clearing for the
state contingent securities requires that the debt issued by the intermediaries matches
the demand of the households, that is,
P
i∈I ai (st+1)=[ r(st+1)+( 1− δ)]K (st).F u r -
ther, equation (12) reﬂects that the state contingent claims are subject to a borrowing
6This assumption implies that intermediaries solve a static problem and consequently helps us
to avoid the shareholder disagreement problem that typically arises with incomplete markets. (See
Cárceles-Poveda and Coen-Pirani, 2008, for further discussion of this issue.) However, due to compe-
tition, intermediaries make zero proﬁts every period, implying that the assumption is without a loss
of generality.
8constraint of Ai(st+1). The equilibrium determination of these limits will be discussed
later on.
If ζi(st+1) ≥ 0 is the multiplier on this constraint, the ﬁrst order conditions with






























t)] ≤ 0 ∀s
t. (14)
Deﬁnition 1. A competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints {Ai}i∈I , and




and prices {w,r,q} such that (i) given prices, {ci,a i} solves the problem for each
household i ∈ I; (ii) the factor prices {w,r} satisfy the optimality conditions of the
ﬁrm; (iii) k satisﬁes the optimality condition of the intermediary; (iv) all markets
clear, i.e., for all st ∈ N, k(st)=K(st),
P
i∈I ai(st+1)=[ r(st+1)+1− δ]K(st),
P
i∈I  i(st)=L(st) and
P
i∈I ci(st)+K(st)=F (st).
As stated in the previous section, households have an outside option of V (Si (st)).
Following the existing literature, we assume that households can leave the risk sharing
arrangement at any date-state to go to ﬁnancial autarky. In this case, they will only be
able to consume their labour income, while they are excluded from ﬁnancial markets
forever.7 To take this into account, we impose endogenous borrowing limits, in the
sense that a looser limit would imply that an agent with that level of debt prefers to
leave the trading arrangement. To deﬁne these borrowing constraints, the value of the

















Deﬁnition 2. The endogenous borrowing constraints {Ai}i∈I satisfy the following
condition for all i ∈ I and all nodes st ∈ N:
W(Ai(s
t),S i(s
t)) = V (Si(s
t)), (16)
















It is important to note that the value of staying in the trading arrangement W
is strictly increasing in asset wealth, whereas the autarky value V is not a function
7Ad i ﬀerent outside option under which households are excluded from trade in Arrow securities
but can still save by accumulating physical capital is considered later on.
9of ai(st). This implies that the limits deﬁned by (16) exist and are unique under our
assumptions on the utility function. Moreover, since W(0,S i(st)) ≥ V (Si(st)) and W
is increasing in ai, equation (16) implies that Ai(st) ≤ 0. Intuitively, no agent would
default with a positive level of wealth, since he could then aﬀord a higher current
c o n s u m p t i o nt h a ni na u t a r k ya n da tl e a s ta sh i g ho fal i f e - t i m eu t i l i t ya si na u t a r k y
from next period on.
Micro foundations for the endogenous limits. So far, we have assumed that
the limits deﬁned by (16) are taken as given by the intermediaries and the agents. In
what follows, we provide further micro foundations for these borrowing constraints by
allowing the intermediaries to set both the limits and the Arrow security prices. We
will consider symmetric Nash equilibria in this setting. In particular, we check whether
an intermediary has gains from deviating from a particular strategy (limits and prices)
while all the other ones stick to the same (equilibrium) strategies. The deviations we
will consider typically involve more lending than the one allowed by the postulated
equilibrium limits, potentially combined with a diﬀerent price. Proposition 1 shows
that the above borrowing limits will arise as an equilibrium outcome if the intermedi-
aries are allowed to set them. The proof of this and of all remaining propositions are
relegated to Appendix 1.
Proposition 1. (i) The competitive equilibrium with endogenous borrowing con-
straints remains a competitive (Nash) equilibrium if the intermediaries are allowed to
set the borrowing limits. (ii) No symmetric competitive (Nash) equilibrium exists with
equilibrium default. (iii) No competitive (Nash) equilibrium with binding borrowing
constraint that are tighter than the endogenous limits deﬁned by (16).
The previous proposition shows ﬁrst that no intermediary has incentives to loosen
or tighten the endogenous limits individually, since these deviations are not proﬁtable.
The proof of the ﬁrst part is intuitive. On the one hand, intermediaries cannot break
even with looser limits regardless of the price they charge, since agents will default for
sure with higher debt levels. On the other hand, since the intermediaries will make
zero proﬁts with any limits that do not allow for default, the intermediaries have no
incentives to tighten them either.
The second part of the proposition implies that no symmetric equilibrium exists
where some or all the relevant limits (the ones that bind in equilibrium) are looser than
the ones dictated by (16). This result is due to the fact that, if there was default, the
intermediaries would be able to increase their proﬁts by not buying Arrow securities
from households with a positive probability of default next period.
The third part states that no equilibrium exists with tighter limits either. Intu-
itively, if some binding limits were any tighter, then any intermediary would be able
to make some positive proﬁts by oﬀering slightly looser limits (so that they are still
tighter than the limits deﬁned by (16)). Whereas this would keep lending still risk-free,
10this intermediary could charge a slightly higher interest rate as agents would like to
borrow more. Note that this is guaranteed by the fact that agents are actually bor-
rowing constrained under the original asset prices q. Hence, there would be a higher
interest rate (lower q) such that they are still willing to borrow more under the new
prices.8
Finally, note that Proposition 1 implies that (at least among the symmetric equilib-
ria) the equilibrium with endogenous borrowing constraints is unique in the following
sense: these are the only possible limits for those states/agents in which a particular
agent’s borrowing constraint is binding.
Note that this proposition does not rely on the fact that we have a production
economy. In fact, the proof would go through in an almost identical way if we consider
an exchange economy. Except for the fact that we would have r(st)=δ =0and
k(st)=0for all st in that case, all the steps of the proof would go through.
Second, notice also that the proof critically relies on the fact that intermediaries
make zero proﬁts in equilibrium. In Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda (2006), we impose
capital accumulation constraints on intermediaries and show that competitive equilib-
ria become eﬃcient with some carefully chosen accumulation constraints. However,
that also implies that intermediaries will make positive proﬁts in equilibrium and the
above argument would not go through. In this sense, the competitive equilibrium
which is constrained eﬃcient is not self-enforcing, since the endogenous limits satis-
fying (16) would not arise as an equilibrium outcome if the intermediation sector has
the ability to set the limits. The fact that this competitive equilibrium has stronger
micro foundations provides a further motivation for studying it despite the fact that
it is ineﬃcient.
3.2. Competitive Equilibrium with Participation Constraints. This section
deﬁnes a competitive equilibrium with complete markets and participation constraints
following Kehoe and Levine (1993). Given that securities are only traded at period
zero, we assume that the representative ﬁrm and the representative ﬁnancial interme-
diary are inﬁnitely lived.9
The representative ﬁrm rents labor from the households and physical capital from
the intermediary to maximize proﬁts, which are sold forward in the state contingent
























8It is important to note that Proposition 1 implies the existence of symmetric equilibria with no
default borrowing constraints as well as the non-existence of symmetric equilibria with equilibrium
default. However, we cannot rule out non-symmetric equilibria where default can arise in equilibrium.
9Note that although both the ﬁrm and the intermediary live for ever, they practically solve a static
problem at time zero taking the prices for state and time contingent goods as given.
11where Q(st|s0) is the price at time zero of consumption at period t,c o n t i n g e n to n















The representative intermediary decides how much capital k(st) to purchase from
households. The capital is rented to the ﬁrm, earning a rental revenue of r(st+1)k(st)
and a liquidation value of (1 − δ)k(st) the following period. The revenues net of




















































































Equation (21) is the consolidated budget constraint in an Arrow Debreu market struc-
ture with trade in period zero, whereas equation (22) illustrates that participation
constraints are imposed as direct restrictions on the consumption sets for every con-
tingency st and time period t. Given the presence of the latter constraints, standard
dynamic programming is not applicable to the previous problem. However, we can
use the recursive contracts approach of Marcet and Marimon (1999) to rewrite the
















































tγi(st) is the Lagrange multiplier of the time t participation constraint for





−1)=0for i ∈ I. (23)








Deﬁnition 3. A competitive equilibrium with participation constraints and initial





{w,r,Q} such that (i) given prices, {ci} solves the problem for each household i ∈ I;
(ii) the factor prices {w,r} satisfy the optimality conditions of the ﬁrm; (iii) k satisﬁes
the optimality condition of the intermediary; (iv) all markets clear, i.e., for all st ∈ N,
k(st)=K(st),
P
i∈I  i(st)=L(st) and
P
i∈I ci(st)+K(st)=F (st).
4. Characterization of the Competitive Equilibria
This section characterizes the competitive equilibria described in section 3. We ﬁrst
show that a competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints is also a competitive
equilibrium with participation constraints and vice versa. Ábrahám and Cárceles-
Poveda (2006) show that the competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints is
suboptimal. Given this, our equivalence results imply that the equilibrium concept
proposed by Kehoe and Levine (1993) is also suboptimal in the presence of endoge-
nous production. We then identify the key source of the ineﬃciency and we provide
an additional characterization of the two competitive equilibrium that makes their
computation easy.
As in the literature, we focus on allocations that have high implied interest rates, in














t) < ∞ (25)



























Propositions 2 and 3 state our main equivalence results.
10This assumption is not very restrictive in the present setting, since it will be satisﬁed whenever





be a competitive equilibrium with par-
ticipation constraints where {c} =
P
i {ci} has high implied interest rates. Then, it is













be a competitive equilibrium with en-




is a competitive equilibrium equilibrium with participation constraints where c =
P
i ci
has high implied interest rates.
Propositions 2 and 3 show that a competitive equilibrium with endogenous bor-
rowing constraints is equivalent to a competitive equilibrium with participation con-
straints.11 To show the equivalence of the equilibria, we have used the fact that the
































An important implication of equation (28) is that the two competitive equilibria are
suboptimal whenever any of the solvency or the participation constraints are binding,
s i n c e( 7 )a n d( 2 8 )c a n n o tb es a t i s ﬁed by the same allocations. The ineﬃciency of
both competitive equilibria is due to the (externality) eﬀect of capital on the value
of autarky, which the intermediaries do not internalize. Propositions 2 and 3 implies
that the same ineﬃciency arises in both the competitive equilibrium with participation
constraints and with endogenous borrowing constraints in the presence of endogenous
production.
In the next section, we analyze the consequences of this ineﬃciency quantitatively.
Before doing this, we provide an additional characterization of the two competitive
equilibria that will make their computation easy. In particular, we show that the
allocations from the competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints (and hence
the allocations of the competitive equilibrium with participation constraints) satisfy
the same system of equations as the constrained eﬃcient problem except the Euler



















11S o m ep a r t so ft h ep r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n s2a n d3f o l l o ws i m i l a ra r g u m e n t st ot h eo n e si nthe
equivalnce proofs of Alvarez and Jermann (2000). However, an important diﬀerence between our
results and theirs is that the previous authors do not have endogenous production sector or a ﬁnancial
intermediation sector. In other words, to prove the equivalence of diﬀerent allocations, we also need
to make sure that the optimality conditions of the ﬁrms and intermediaries are satisﬁed.
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Propositions 4 and 5 provide a useful characterization of the competitive equilibria
deﬁned earlier, since they show that the equilibrium allocations solve a system of
equations that is very similar to the one of the constrained eﬃcient allocation. As
noted earlier, the equilibrium allocations are diﬀerent from the optimal allocation only
due to the fact that they ignore the autarky eﬀects. In other words, as opposed to the
social planner, the ﬁnancial intermediaries (or the households) do not internalize the
eﬀect of capital accumulation on the agents’ autarky valuations.
We believe, that these propositions are particularly important, since they char-
acterize an empirically more plausible competitive equilibrium which can be used to
analyze several applied questions where capital accumulation and limited commitment
are both important. As an example, one could study consumption and wealth inequal-
ity along the growth path, where capital accumulation can play an important role in
determining the incentives to default. The computation of competitive equilibrium
for this type of non-optimal economies is potentially very demanding. In these cases,
one important implication of the above propositions is that computing the equilibrium
would not require any extra burden as compared to the relatively easy computation
of the optimal solution. This is brieﬂy illustrated in the next section.
5. Quantitative Comparison of the Allocations: An Illustrative
Example
This section compares the competitive equilibrium allocations to the constrained eﬃ-
cient allocation numerically. To do this, we focus on the competitive equilibrium with
solvency constraints. We ﬁrst describe the benchmark calibration and the solution
method. Next, we discuss the quantitative ﬁndings.
5.1. Calibration and Solution Method. The benchmark parameters are cali-
brated following the asset pricing and real business cycle literature. The time period is
assumed to be one quarter, and the discount factor and depreciation rate are therefore
set to β =0 .99 and δ =0 .025.T h e ﬁrst parameter is chosen to generate an annual
15average interest rate of approximately 4% in the stationary distribution, whereas the
second replicates the US average investment to capital ratio during the postwar period.
Concerning the functional forms, we assume that the production function is Cobb-
Douglas, with a constant capital share of α =0 .36. Further, the utility function of the
households is assumed to be u(c)=l o g ( c). Finally, the exogenous shock processes are
assumed to be independent with each other. In particular, the aggregate technology
shock follows a two state Markov chain with z ∈ {zl,z h} = {0.99,1.01},a n di t s












The aggregate labor supply is constant and we normalize it to 1. As to the idio-
syncratic income process, it is assumed to follow a seven state Markov chain. The
values and transition matrix of the Markov chain are obtained by using the Tauchen
and Hussey (1991) procedure to discretize the following process:
 
i0 =( 1− ψ )μ  + ψ  
i + u, u ∼ N(0,σ
2
u).
The autoregressive and variance parameters are set to ψ  =0 .956 and σ2
u =0 .082,c o r -
responding to quarterly adjusted estimates from annual idiosyncratic earnings data.12
To simplify our computations and to relate to the existing literature, we assume
that economy is populated by two agent types. The values for  1 a r et h e nc h o s e nt o
be symmetric around 0.5 and we assume that  2 =1−  1 so that the labor supply is
constant. This implies that the idiosyncratic productivity of the two types follows the
same process and the shocks are perfectly negatively correlated across the two types.
As to the solution method, Propositions 4 and 5 imply that we can use the same
algorithm for both the constrained eﬃcient and the competitive equilibrium alloca-
tions. Looking at the system of equations that each allocation solves, and using the
fact that shocks are Markovian, it is easy to see that the allocations are recursive in





Note that λ has a diﬀerent interpretation depending on the allocation. In the con-
strained eﬃcient allocation, λ can be interpreted as the time varying relative Pareto
weight of type 2 households relative to type 1. In the competitive equilibrium, λdoes
not have the interpretation of a “temporary” relative Pareto weight in the competitive
equilibrium but rather of a measure of relative wealth. To see this, consider the com-
petitive equilibrium with solvency constraints. If we deﬁn et h eL a g r a n g em u l t i p l i e r s
12The discretization of this process gives positive values for all the states.
16of the budget constraint in (11) by π(st)β








where the second inequality is a consequence of Proposition 5. The above identity
implies that λ(st) measures the relative wealth of type 2 versus type 1, since the
bigger is the asset wealth ai(st), the smaller is ξi(st), which measures the marginal
utility of wealth. Therefore a higher λ(st) implies that agent 1 has a smaller initial
wealth compared to type 2 households.
Apart from the fact that the allocations are recursive in ( i,  −i,z,K,λ),t h es y m -
metry of the households implies that we only need to include their own idiosyncratic
shock in the individual state vector. Further, it is easy to see that 1/λ measures the
relative Pareto weight of a given household type if λ is the relative Pareto weight of the
other type. Therefore, s1 =[  ,λ;z,K] implies s2 =[ 1− ,1/λ;z,K]. Since the shocks
are assumed to be Markovian, the previous set of equations imply that we can describe
the optimal allocations in both models by the consumption functions {ci(si)}i∈I,t h e
multipliers {νi(si)}i∈I and the laws of motion for the relative wealth λ
0 = λ(s1) and
the aggregate capital K0 = K(s1). To solve for both the constrained eﬃcient and
the competitive equilibrium allocations, we use a policy iteration algorithm that is
described in more detail in the Appendix.13
5.2. Quantitative Findings. Our numerical results for this benchmark parame-
trization are presented in Figures 1 to 6 of Appendix 3. All the optimal policies are
conditioned on the low aggregate technology shock z =0 .99 and on K =3 8 .6,w h i c h
is the mean of the stationary distribution of capital, but similar pictures can be ob-
tained for the high technology shock. For expositional convenience, we have plotted
the results for only three levels of the labour endowment, where  1 is the lowest and  7
is the highest labor endowment. Recall that type 2 households have the highest labor
endowment when type 1 households have the lowest. Note also that both types have
equal endowments when type 1 households have  4 =1−  4 =0 .5. Finally, in all the
ﬁgures, the competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints is labelled as ‘Competi-
tive Equilibrium’, while the constrained eﬃcient allocation is labelled as ‘Constrained
Eﬃciency’.
Figure 1 displays λ
0 as a function of λ for the three diﬀerent levels of the idio-
syncratic income shocks. The ﬁrst important observation, based on this ﬁgure, is
that agents enjoy permanent perfect risk sharing in the long run in both models.
To see this, assume ﬁr s tt h a to u ri n i t i a lλ is inside its ergodic set, which is equal
to λ ∈ [0.8368,1.195] and λ ∈ [0.8366,1.1953] for the models without and with the
13This algorithm can be easily extended to a context with a continuum of agents. More details of
this extension can be provided by the authors upon request.
17savings constraint respectively. As we see on the graph, λ
0 = λ inside this region, inde-
pendently of the labor income shocks. However, this can only happen if neither agent’s
participation constraint is binding. In addition, the ratio of marginal utilities remains
constant over time. The last result, however, is the deﬁning feature of a perfect risk
sharing allocation.
Assume now that we start with λ>2.5, implying that type 1 households hold
signiﬁcantly lower initial assets, and they are therefore entitled to less consumption
than type 2 households. In this case, Figure 1 implies that λ
0 depends on the idiosyn-
cratic income of the agent, and that it will drop to a new level depending on the shock
realization. In particular, the higher the idiosyncratic income is, the lower will be the
new level of the relative wealth λ
0.T h i si sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a tt y p e1a g e n t sw i l lt h e n
enjoy a higher autarky value and require therefore a higher compensation for staying
in the risk sharing arrangement.
H e r e ,i ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a t ,w h e n e v e rλ jumps, type 1 agents’ participation
constraint is binding, and this new level of λ
0 pins down the borrowing constraint of
the competitive equilibrium faced by type 1 households in the previous period. This
process will go on until the highest income ( 7)i se x p e r i e n c e db yt h et y p e1a g e n t s .I n
this case, λ will enter the stationary distribution14 (λ =1 .195) and remain constant
forever. Thus, agents will enjoy permanent perfect risk sharing from that period
on. In addition, a symmetric argument implies that whenever λ<0.83, λ will become
0.83and remain constant forever after ﬁnite number of periods. Finally, whereas agents
will obtain full insurance in the long-run for any initial wealth distribution, note that
the economy may experience movements in consumption and in λ in the short run.
The second important observation is that two economies are qualitatively very sim-
ilar. As stated above, the long-run behavior is practically identical, in the sense that
there is perfect risk sharing in the long run. In addition, if λ(s0) ∈ [0.8368,1.195],
the long-run allocations will be identical. This is due to the fact that the borrowing
constraints will never bind in this case in either of the two economies. Thus, the indi-
vidual consumptions will be determined by λ(s0) and the capital accumulation will be
(unconstrained) eﬃcient. However, if λ(s0) is outside the above interval, the long-run
allocations will be somewhat diﬀerent due to the fact that the bounds of the stationary
distribution are slightly diﬀerent in the two models. As we see, the constrained eﬃcient
allocation allows for a slightly wider range of λ (the wealth distribution) where the
participation constraints are not binding. As we will see below, this is the consequence
of the diﬀerent capital accumulation pattern in the two economies.
Figure 2 shows the optimal consumption of type 1 households in the two economies
14We use the terms ergodic set and the stationary distribution loosely in this paper. Notice, however
that we deﬁned these sets as the possible values of λ in the long run. In fact, the initial condition λ0
will pin down a unique long-run value for the relative wealth, that is, for any given initial value, the
long run distribution is degenerate.
18as a function of λ for diﬀerent levels of the labor endowment. Obviously, as the relative
wealth of type 1 households decreases (λ increases) their consumption decreases. Also,
since we have perfect risk sharing in the stationary distribution, consumption does not
depend on the idiosyncratic labour endowment there. For the same reason, the opti-
mal consumption allocations are identical across the two models in this range. Outside
the stationary distribution, as expected, consumption is increasing in the labour en-
dowment. We also observe that in the constrained eﬃcient allocation consumption is
higher for every λand   outside the stationary distribution. As explained below, this
is the consequence of higher capital accumulation in the competitive equilibrium.
Figure 3 displays the next period’s aggregate capital K0 as a function of λ and
 . Again, aggregate capital is independent of both the wealth distribution and the
l a b o u re n d o w m e n t si nt h es t a t i o n a r yd i s t r i b u t i o n ,w h e r ei ti sa ti t se ﬃcient level.
In contrast, markets are eﬀectively incomplete outside the stationary distribution,
where we see a higher capital accumulation. This result is well-documented in models
with exogenously incomplete markets (see e.g. Aiyagari (1994) for a model without
aggregate uncertainty and Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda (2007) for a model with a
similar set-up but trade in physical capital only). As reﬂected by the ﬁgure, a similar
behavior arises in the present setting. In particular, capital accumulation is higher
when the low idiosyncratic labour endowment coincides with low wealth (high λ).
This is the case for type 1 households on the upper right corner of the ﬁgure and for
type 2 households in the upper left corner.
To see why this happens, we can look at Figure 1 and at the Euler equation of the
constrained eﬃcient problem. It is clear from Figure 1 that, when type 1 households
have a labour endowment of  7 and low λ (high wealth), the participation constraint
of type 2 households is going to be binding in many continuation states (vi(st+1) > 0).
In turn, this implies that the return of investment is higher, and more capital will be
accumulated.
In the competitive equilibrium, this is equivalent to an increase of most of the Arrow
security prices q(st+1|st), implying that intermediaries have to pay a lower return to
t h ea g e n t sa n dc a nt h e r e f o r ei n v e s tm o r e . T h i si st h eo n l ye ﬀect in the competitive
equilibrium. In contrast, this over accumulation is mitigated by the autarky eﬀects in
the constrained eﬃcient allocation. In this case, the planner internalizes that a higher
capital will increase the autarky values, leading to a lower capital accumulation than
in the competitive equilibrium. In this case, households will also have less incentives
to default, since the value of their outside option is lower due to a lower capital
accumulation. As a consequence, we obtain perfect risk sharing for a higher range of
the wealth distribution (a higher range of λ) in the constrained eﬃcient allocation.
Using the results stated in Proposition 2 in Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda (2006),
we have also depicted the individual consumptions ci and the next period capital stock
K0 as a function of the initial Arrow security holdings a1 and the same levels of idiosyn-
19cratic shocks in Figures 4 and 5.15 As already documented above, Figure 5 illustrates
that capital accumulation is always higher in the economy with no capital accumu-
lation constraints. In particular, capital accumulation is the highest when the low
idiosyncratic shock for the type 1 households  1 is combined with a low level of initial
asset holdings a1, or when the high idiosyncratic shock for the type 1 households  7 is
combined with a high level of initial asset holdings a1.W ea l s on o t et h a tt h ed i ﬀer-
ence between the two economies is signiﬁcant. In the competitive equilibrium, average
i n v e s t m e n ti s1 5 %m o r et h a ni nt h ec o n s t r a i n e de ﬃcient allocation when the lowest
wealth coincides with the lowest income. Consequently, consumption will be higher
in the constrained eﬃcient allocation, especially with these combinations of idiosyn-
cratic income and initial asset holdings. This is reﬂected in ﬁgure 4. Finally, note
that the supported asset distribution is wider for the constrained eﬃcient allocation.
This implies that agents are facing tighter borrowing constraints in the competitive
equilibria, a fact that is not surprising given that higher capital accumulation increases
the incentives to default.
Finally, Figure 6 shows the welfare loss in the competitive equilibrium relative to
t h ec o n s t r a i n te ﬃcient allocation in consumption equivalent percentage terms for dif-
ferent initial wealth levels and income shocks. Obviously, welfare is identical across
the two economies in the stationary distribution, since the allocations are identical.
Outside the stationary distribution, however, agents gain some utility in the competi-
tive equilibrium compared to the constrained eﬃcient allocation if they are relatively
wealthy (a1 > 30) and they loose some utility when they are less wealthy (a1 < 10).
This can be explained by the following two eﬀects. First, both the equilibrium and the
constrained eﬃcient allocations exhibit full risk sharing in the long run, implying that
they sustain the same long run level of capital. However, outside the ergodic set (or
during the transition towards perfect risk sharing), capital is higher and consumption
is lower in the competitive equilibrium. Note that a higher aggregate capital leads to
higher wages, an eﬀect that beneﬁts all agents. Second, the competitive equilibrium
exhibits less risk sharing in the short run due to the fact that borrowing constraints
are tighter (capital accumulation is higher). This hurts everybody but particularly the
poor agents, who are more likely to be borrowing constrained. Overall, the fact that
capital and wages are higher in the competitive equilibrium dominates the consump-
tion and risk sharing loses for rich agents, whereas the opposite happens with poor
agents.
Overall, we conclude that both economies have very similar allocations in the long
run (stationary distribution), and they exhibit some important diﬀerences in the short
run. As we have seen, the model without capital accumulation constraints leads to
15In the constrained eﬃcient allocations, asset wealth also includes the ownership of shares in the
ﬁnancial intermediary, since the intermediaries make positive proﬁts. For these calculations, we have
assumed that both types hold initially the same amount of shares.
20higher short run capital accumulation and consequently to a lower current consump-
tion. A key question is how robust these properties are to some key features of our
model and calibration. In order to check this, we have also investigated several varia-
tions of the above model and calibration in what follows.
Relaxing the Autarky Punishment. In the ﬁrst experiment, we allow agents
to accumulate physical capital in autarky, increasing the value of the outside option
and limiting the scope of risk sharing in both economies. Formally, the autarky value















































represents the individual capital holdings of type i ∈ I households.
Note that the budget constraint in (30) implies that households face (exogenously)
incomplete asset markets after default. Further, the ﬁrst constraint in (31) reﬂects
that households can only save but not borrow (short-sell) physical capital after default.
Finally, we assume that they take the aggregate capital accumulation and therefore
the current and future prices (w(st+τ) and r(st+τ)) as given. Since we only consider
individual (Nash) deviations and there is no default in equilibrium, these expectations
are indeed rational. Finally, in this case, it is not obvious ex ante whether higher
aggregate capital leads to higher or lower autarky values, because although it increases
wages it also reduces the interest rate.
Whereas we obtain a narrower range of λ in the stationary distribution, all the key
qualitative ﬁndings of our original model are robust to this extension. In particular,
we still ﬁnd a perfect risk sharing in the long-run in both economies, while there is
higher capital accumulation and a lower consumption in the short run in the con-
strained eﬃcient allocation.16 We can therefore conclude that neither the qualitative
diﬀerences between the two equilibria nor the long-run perfect risk sharing property
is a consequence of the tight autarky penalty that we have assumed in the benchmark
model. This also implies that the interest rate eﬀect is quantitatively less important
than the wage eﬀect, in determining the overall impact of capital on the autarky value
in our setup.
Using Diﬀerent Parameterizations. To see if our results are robust to diﬀer-
ent parameter values, we have also studied a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent parametrization of
the benchmark model. First, it is clear that a lower individual discount factor will
make default more attractive in this environment. For this reason, we have set β to
16More detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
210.65. This relatively low value of the discount factor was used by Alvarez and Jermann
(2001), who study asset pricing implications of limited commitment in an endowment
economy. Since this parametrization is more consistent with an annual model, we have
also increased δ to 0.1. Second, it is clear that our economy is approaching a pure
exchange economy as the one studied by Alvarez and Jermann (2000) as α goes to
0. In addition, the higher α is, the more important capital income becomes for the
determination of the agents’ consumption. In other words, a lower capital share will
make default ceteris paribus more attractive. Given this, we have reduced α to 0.20.17
Some of the key results resulting from this parametrization are shown on Figures 7
to 9. As shown by Figure 7, the long-run stationary distribution of λis not degenerate
with the new parameterization, implying that the individual shares of aggregate con-
sumption are ﬂuctuating in the long run. First, this shows that the full risk sharing
result obtained with the benchmark parametrization is due to the speciﬁc parame-
ter values we have chosen before. Second, our results illustrate that the qualitative
diﬀerences between the two allocations (competitive equilibrium and constrained eﬃ-
cient) remain the same with the new parameterization. In particular, the competitive
equilibrium is accumulating more capital, whereas the constrained eﬃcient economy
does not Pareto dominate the competitive equilibrium. Since these economies do not
exhibit full risk sharing in the long run, we can also study the diﬀerences between the
two equilibria in the stationary distribution.
These observations are also related to the ﬁndings in Thomas and Worrall (1988)
and Kocherlakota (1996) (for a textbook treatment of these papers, see Ljungqvist
and Sargent, 2004, Chapter 20). These authors study endowment economies with two
agents under limited commitment. Thus, the two agent economy we simulate is an
extension of their framework to production and capital accumulation.
First, one of their main ﬁndings is that constrained eﬃcient allocations can be fully
characterized by an interval of consumption levels (or equivalently relative Pareto
weights λ) for each income level. These intervals deﬁne the set of relative Pareto
weights such that both agents are willing to stay in the risk sharing arrangements.
Further, each of the end points in the interval is determined by one of the agents
being indiﬀerent between paying back or defaulting. Our ﬁgures 1 and 7 show that
this characterization remains true in an environment with production, for a given level
of aggregate capital K. In particular, the intervals that characterize the constrained
eﬃcient allocations for a given level of income   can be recovered from the ﬁgures as
the intervals of λ such that λ
0 = λ.
Second, the authors also show that an economy will experience perfect risk sharing
in the long run if the intersection of these intervals is not the empty set. In our
framework, Figure 1 shows that these intervals have an intersection which determines
17This value is actually consistent with the estimates of Lustig (2004), who classiﬁes proprietor’s
income from farms and partnerships as labor income.
22the range of relative wealth positions (λ) that are possible in the ergodic set. Obviously,
since we have aggregate shocks and capital accumulation, we need to make sure that
the intersection of these intervals is non-empty for all capital levels and aggregate
shocks in the stationary distribution of aggregate capital. In contrast, the intersection
of these intervals is empty for the parametrization of the model displayed in Figure 7,
in which case there is no perfect risk sharing in the long run.
Third, Kocherlakota (1996) shows that, in endowment economies, there is a level
of patience β above which perfect risk sharing is the long run outcome. This result
seems to be also true in our production economy, since perfect risk sharing does not
obtain with a relatively low level of patience, while it obtains in the benchmark case.
In particular, our results indicate that this threshold level of patience is not too high
in production economies.18
Figure 8 displays the path for the aggregate capital stock in the stationary distrib-
ution and along some (artiﬁcial) business cycle simulations19. On the second panel of
the ﬁgure, the aggregate productivity shock alternates between 10 low and 10 high val-
ues. At the same time, we draw 1000 independent samples of the idiosyncratic process
o ft h ea g e n t sf o rt h es a m et i m eh o r i z o na n dw ea v e r a g eo u tt h er e s u l t sa c r o s st h e s e
independent samples. Both the time series and the “business cycle” ﬁgures show that
the aggregate capital stock is indeed higher in the competitive equilibrium. Finally,
Figure 9 shows how the expected welfare of an agent changes during these artiﬁcial
business cycles. Note that, by the law of large numbers, this expected welfare can be
interpreted as the aggregate (social) welfare in the stationary distribution that arises
if we assign equal weights to both types. Strikingly, we see that welfare is higher under
the competitive equilibrium throughout the business cycle. This result suggests that,
on average, the higher income in this economy due to a higher capital accumulation
oﬀsets the welfare loss due to less risk sharing. Of course, since this allocation is not
constrained eﬃcient but satisﬁes the constraints of the planner’s problem by construc-
tion, agents will suﬀer welfare losses during the transition towards the higher capital
levels that will more than oﬀset the long run gains.
6. Conclusions
This paper studies an economy with capital accumulation and aggregate risk where
households are subject to borrowing constraints that do not allow for default. We ﬁrst
show that the borrowing limits that do not allow for default arise as an equilibrium
18Here, it is important to note that all the above observations hold for both the competitive
equilibrium and the constrained eﬃcient allocations, with the only exception that in the competitive
equilibrium allocations we cannot (explicitly) interpret λ as a temporary Pareto weight.
19Note that we only plot Figures 8 and 9 for the alternative parameterization, since the bench-
mark economy exhibits full risk sharing in the stationary distribution and therefore there will be no
diﬀerence between the competitive equilibrium and the constrained eﬃcient allocations in the long
run.
23outcome if the intermediaries are allowed to set them. In this sense, we provide further
micro foundations for the endogenous borrowing limits.
Moreover, we show that the equilibrium allocations of our economy are not con-
strained eﬃcient. Despite this, we show that they solve a similar system of equations as
the constrained eﬃcient allocation. This characterization identiﬁes a new source of in-
eﬃciency that arises in economies with capital accumulation and limited commitment.
Moreover, it also considerably simpliﬁes the equilibrium computation.
We also compare numerically the constrained and competitive equilibrium allo-
cations in our economy. First, we ﬁnd that the calibration plays a crucial role in
the determination of the degree of risk sharing in the long run. Whereas the two
economies exhibit perfect risk sharing with a standard calibration, the long run allo-
cations are characterized by imperfect risk sharing if agents become more impatient
or the weight of capital income in their total income is lower. Second, while the
two economies behave qualitatively very similar, capital accumulation is higher in the
competitive equilibrium. This result is robust to alternative autarky penalties and
diﬀe r e n tc a l i b r a t i o n so ft h em o d e l .H e r e ,w ew o u l dl i k et op o i n to u tt h a to u rr e s u l ti s
in contrast to the ﬁndings in Davila et al. (2005). As shown by the authors capital is
under-accumulated in the competitive equilibrium relative to the constrained eﬃcient
allocation in a model with exogenous incomplete markets. In their model, however, a
higher aggregate capital has the positive eﬀect of helping the consumption-poor agents,
who mostly rely on labor income, whereas in our model it has the negative eﬀect of
increasing the incentives to default for all agents. Third, we also ﬁnd that a higher
capital accumulation implies that welfare in the long run is higher in the competitive
equilibrium in spite of the fact that this allocation is ineﬃcient. This result indicates
that less risk sharing can have non-trivial beneﬁts in production economies due to
precautionary capital accumulation.
This setup can be used to study more applied questions as well. For example, using
a similar setup, Krueger and Perri (2006) study why the rise in earnings inequality was
not accompanied by a similar rise in consumption inequality in the last two decades.
They solve for the competitive equilibrium allocations with endogenous borrowing
constraints. According to our results, there is a scope for governmental intervention
in their setting, as the competitive equilibria (and in particular the level of aggregate
savings) is not constrained eﬃcient. A set of important questions then arises. How
large is the overall welfare loss, whether it is distributed equally across households
with diﬀerent income and wealth levels and whether there is a simple tax policy which
would increase aggregate welfare in their environment. These are interesting issues
that we leave for further research.
APPENDIX 1: Proofs
24Proof of Proposition 1. (i) We ﬁrst show that there are no proﬁtable deviations
from the equilibrium allocation with limits that are tighter or looser then the ones
deﬁned by (16). To see this, ﬁrst notice that tightening the limits will not increase
the proﬁts of any intermediary. Further, we now show that no intermediary can make
positive proﬁts by loosening the limits, that is, by setting A0
i(st) ≤ Ai(st) < 0 for all
st and any agent i ∈ I. T od ot h i s ,c o n s i d e rn o d ee s and assume (without a loss of
generality) that A0
i(b s) <A i(b s) for some node b s|e s in which the borrowing constraint
is binding for type i agents at the level of wealth Ai(b s). Under the original prices
q(st+1|e s),t h i si m p l i e st h a tt y p ei agents would default next period if node b s|e s occurs.
Since these households would choose ai(b s) <A i(b s) < 0 and default if b s occurs, it is
easy to see that the intermediary would make negative proﬁts. First deﬁne a0
i(st+1|e s)
as the asset decision of type i households under the new limits and observe that
a0
i(b s) <A i(b s) ≤ 0 under q(b s|e s). Then, default of type i households imply that the














t+1)+( 1− δ)]k(e s)=0 .
The second equality follows from the equilibrium condition of the intermediaries in
(10). Note that the above equation implies that he cannot break even if he is able
to charge a lower price than q(b s|e s), because type i agents will default in state-date b s
with certainty. Obviously, he cannot reduce the price for other agents who borrow or
increase the price for another agents who save to increase his proﬁts, because those
agents will prefer the original prices which are oﬀered by the rest of the intermediation
sector.
(ii) We now show that there does not exist any symmetric equilibrium which allows
for default. To do this, we assume there exists an equilibrium with prices q and limits
{Ai}i∈I such that agents of type i would default under some continuation history
st+1|st = b s|st if the current history is st = e s. First, notice that perfect competition






t+1)+( 1− δ)]k(e s)+q(b s|e s)ai(b s)=0 .







t+1)+( 1− δ)]k(e s) > 0.





t+1)+( 1− δ)] − 1 > 0.
25The previous condition implies that any intermediary could make arbitrarily high
positive proﬁts by trading only with agents of type j 6= i and by demanding arbitrary




st+1|h s q(st+1|e s)aj(st+1|e s)) from them. However,
this contradicts the fact that the original portfolio was optimal for the intermediaries
under q(st+1|st).
(iii) We now show that there does not exist any symmetric equilibrium with binding
limits that are tighter than the endogenous borrowing limits satisfying (16). To do
this, we assume there exists an equilibrium with prices q and limits {Ai}i∈I such that
in state e s the limits are such that Ai(b s|e s) > ˜ Ai(b s|e s) where ˜ Ai(b s|e s) would be the limit
satisfying (16) and type i agents are borrowing constrained, that is ai(b s|e s)=Ai(b s|e s)
and from (13), we have that
q(s
t+1|s








Notice that perfect competition would still require that intermediaries make zero
proﬁts with prices q. In addition, by continuity, (32) implies that there will be a lower
price ˜ q(b s|e s) that is close enough to q(b s|e s) such the type i agents would be willing to
borrow more than ai(b s|e s)=Ai(b s|e s) with this new price ˜ q(b s|e s) <q (b s|e s). As long as the
intermediary is lending less than ˜ Ai(b s|e s), agent i will not default and the intermediary
will increase its proﬁts by this deviation as he can resell these claims for continuation
state b s|e s for q(b s|e s) > ˜ q(b s|e s). Hence, we cannot have a competitive equilibrium with
binding limits that are tighter than the endogenous limits deﬁned by (16).¥
Proof of Proposition 2. Given the prices {Q} in the competitive equilibrium
with participation constraints, deﬁne the prices in the competitive equilibrium with









Clearly, the factor prices {w,r} and the aggregate capital stock {K} = {k} that
satisfy the optimality conditions of the ﬁrm (18)-(19) in the competitive equilibrium
with participation constraints also satisfy the optimality conditions of the ﬁrm (8)-(9)
in the competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints.
We now show that the allocations that satisfy the optimality condition of the
intermediary (20) in the competitive equilibrium with participation constraints also
satisfy the optimality condition of the intermediary (10) in the competitive equilibrium
with solvency constraints. This follows from the fact that conditions (10) and (20) in

















26To see that this is the case, consider ﬁrst the competitive equilibrium with solvency
constraints. First, the portfolio constraint in (12) cannot be binding for all agent types.
It therefore follows that ςi(st+1)=0for at least one household type and the households’












Second, substituting for the Arrow price q(st+1|st) and the interest rate r(st+1)=
FK (st+1) in (10), we obtain (33). Consider now the competitive equilibrium with






for i ∈ I.
where γi is the multiplier on the participation constraint of agent i and μi is the
r e c u r s i v ec o - s t a t ev a r i a b l e . S i n c eμi(st−1)+1> 0, it follows that υi(st) > 0 only if
γi(st) > 0. In other words, the multiplier υi is positive only when the participation
constraint of type i ∈ I is binding. Second, using the expression for υi and the

























and the last equality follows from the properties of υi. If we substitute for the ratio of
Arrow Debreu prices and the interest rate r(st+1)=FK (st+1) in (20), we also obtain
(33), as claimed.
Since the high implied interest rate condition holds, we can then use the prices
{Q} and the consumption allocations {ci}i∈I from the competitive equilibrium with
participation constraints to construct the asset holdings {ai}i∈I that satisfy the budget
constraint of the households in the competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints.










































Concerning the trading limits, if υi(st)=0for agent i in the competitive equilib-




st+n|st Q(st+n|st)w(st+n) i (st+n)
27and we will redeﬁne this limit later. Further, if υi(st) > 0, we set Ai(st+1)=ai(st+1),
implying that the limit in the competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints will
be binding exactly when the participation constraint in (22) is binding.
To make sure that the optimality conditions of the households are satisﬁed, we can
use q(st+1|st) to deﬁne the multiplier ζi(st+1) so that the Euler condition in (13) holds.
It is easy to check that the multiplier will have the desired properties. In particular,
if υi(st+1)=0 , ζi(st+1)=0 .F u r t h e r ,i fυi(st+1) > 0, it follows that ζi(st+1) > 0.






























































































The ﬁr s ti n e q u a l i t yf o l l o w sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a t[ai(st)−Ai(st)] is equal to zero if the














st+n|st Q(st+n|st)w(st+n) i (st+n). The second inequality fol-
lows from the fact that ci(st) ≤
P
i ci(st). The third inequality follows from the the




Finally, the last equality follows form the high implied interest rate condition.
Finally, we can construct the value functions W(ai(st);Si(st)) and V (Si(st)) from
the value functions of the competitive equilibrium with participation constraints and
redeﬁne the borrowing constraints on Arrow security holdings so that they satisfy
W(Ai(st+1);Si(st+1)) = V (Si(st+1)) at every node. Since these limits do not bind for
the originally unconstrained consumers, the constructed allocations are still feasible
and optimal. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . Given the Arrow prices {q} in the competitive equilib-
rium with solvency constraints, deﬁne the prices in the competitive equilibrium with










Clearly, the factor prices {w,r} that satisfy the optimality conditions of ﬁrms in
the competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints also satisfy the optimality con-
ditions of the ﬁrms in the competitive equilibrium with participation constraints. In
28addition, using the same arguments as in the proof of proposition 2, it is easy to show
that the allocations that satisfy the optimality condition of the intermediary in the
competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints also satisfy the optimality condi-



















Substituting forward for (ai)i∈I i nt h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n to ft h ec o m p e t i t i v ee q u i -
librium with solvency constraints and using the expression for {Q} deﬁned above, it is
easy to see that the consumption allocations (ci)i∈I that satisfy the budget constraint
of the competitive equilibrium with solvency constraint also satisfy the budget con-
straint of the households in the competitive equilibrium with participation constraints
at these prices. Moreover, since the asset holdings (ai)i∈I in the competitive equilib-
rium with solvency constraints are subject to portfolio restrictions {Ai}i∈I that are not
too tight, the value functions W(ai(st);Si(st)) and V (Si(st)) satisfy the participation
constraints in (22).
Note that the allocations in the competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints
still solve the same problem if the borrowing constraints on the Arrow securities of the


















and optimality implies that the previous limit is ﬁnite.20 In addition, since the shocks
z and   lie in a compact set, the present values of K and fL are ﬁnite, we can use the
resource constraint to show that the allocation of the competitive equilibrium with
solvency constraints satisﬁes the high implied interest rate condition.
To make sure that the optimality condition for households in the competitive equi-
librium with participation constraints is satisﬁed, the multipliers (μi)i∈I, (ηi)i∈I, (γi)i∈I
and (υi)i∈I can be recovered as follows. First, assume, without loss of generality, that
the portfolio constraint in the competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints is not
binding for household i at node st, hence we set υi(st)=0and γi (st)=0for i ∈ I.








20In an exchange economy context with sequential trade and potentially incomplete ﬁnancial mar-
kets, Santos and Woodford (1997) show that the natural borrowing limit implied by the optimal
allocations has to be ﬁnite. Otherwise, one can construct a portfolio that yields more utility than the
optimal allocation. The same proof can be used in the present setup.
29W ec a nt h e nr e c o v e rγi (st) and μi (st) from the deﬁnition of υi and from the law of

















and the multiplier ηi is given by ηi = u0 (ci(s0))(1 + γi (s0)).This guarantees that the
consumption allocations of the competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints also
satisfy the optimality condition of the households in the competitive equilibrium with
participation constraints.¥
Proof of Proposition 4. The factor prices w(st) and r(st) that satisfy the
optimality conditions of the ﬁrm in the competitive equilibrium can be constructed
from the capital levels of the original allocation using equations (8)-(9). Given the
consumption allocations {ci}i∈I that solve equations (2), (6) and (29), we can use
equations (27) and (26) to deﬁne the prices Q(st+1|st)=Qp(st+1|st) and q(st+1|st)=
qp(st+1|st) that satisfy (13). Since the high implied interest rate condition holds, we can
then use these prices and the consumption allocations in order to construct the asset
holdings {ai}i∈I that satisfy the budget constraint of the households in the competitive
equilibrium (equation (11)) exactly as in the proof of Proposition 2 (see equations (34)
and (35)).
Note that the initial value for the ratio of marginal utilities pins down the initial
asset levels in the competitive equilibrium. It is also easy to see that an allocation
that satisﬁes condition (29) also satisﬁes the competitive equilibrium condition of
the intermediary in (28).Finally, we can determine the limits Ai(st+1) and show that
the transversality condition is satisﬁed exactly as in the latter part of the proof of
Proposition 2. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . To prove the proposition, we ﬁrst note that the resource
constraint in (5) is satisﬁed by the competitive equilibrium allocations. Since the asset
holdings are subject to portfolio restrictions {Ai}i∈I that are not too tight, the value


















r−tπ(sr|st)u(w(sr) i(sr)). Given this, the functions de-
ﬁned by W(Si(st)) = Wce(ai(st),S i(st)) and V (Si(st)) = V ce(Si(st)) satisfy the par-
ticipation constraints in (2). Similarly to the proof of Proposition 3, we can show that
the competitive equilibrium allocations still solve the same problem if the borrowing
constraints on the Arrow securities of the unconstrained households are substituted for
30the natural borrowing limits (see equation (36)) and that the competitive equilibrium
allocation satisﬁes the high implied interest rate condition.
To recover the multipliers {λ} and {vi}i∈I,w ec a nﬁrst use the equilibrium con-
sumption allocations to deﬁne
u0(ci(st))
u0(cj(st)) for any i,j ∈ I. Further, {vi}i∈I can be recov-
ered as in the proof of proposition 3 (see equations (37) and (??)). Clearly, this implies
that equation (6) is satisﬁed. In addition, the zero proﬁt condition in the decentralized

































Given this, the Euler equation in (29) is also satisﬁed.¥
APPENDIX 2: Computational Method
The implementation of the algorithm used to solve for the two economies is de-
scribed in what follows. We initially deﬁne a grid on the endogenous state space, given
by the relative weight λ and by the aggregate capital stock K. Note that the grid on
the exogenous state space ( ,z) is implicitly deﬁned by our Markov chain assumption.
We let s1 =[  ,λ;z,K] and s2 =[ 1−  ,1/λ;z,K].
Given the grid on λ, K and ( ,z), our procedure ﬁnds continuous equilibrium policy
functions for the individual consumptions c1 ≡ c( ,λ;z,K) and c2 ≡ c(1 −  ,1/λ;z,K),
the multipliers v1 ≡ v( ,λ;z,K) and v2 ≡ v(1 −  ,1/λ;z,K), the next period rela-
tive weight λ0≡ λ( ,λ,K,z), and the law of motion for the aggregate capital stock
K0 ≡ K( ,λ,K,z), such that all the equilibrium conditions are satisﬁed.
To ﬁnd the solution for a given grid point, we start assuming that the participation
constraints are not binding for any of the two types. This implies that vi =0for
i =1 ,2 and λ0=λ. Using the equilibrium policy functions, the value functions W1 ≡
W( ,λ;z,K), W2 ≡ W(1− ,1/λ;z,K), V1 = V ( ,λ,K,z) and V2 = V (1− ,1/λ;z,K)
are calculated recursively and we then check if the participation constraints are actually
binding. If they are not binding, the solution is correct. Otherwise, we impose the
participation constraint and recalculate the solution.
All the previous objects are approximated with continuous functions using linear
interpolation over the ﬁnite and endogenous grid, and the procedure is repeated until
convergence. More precisely, given a set of functions of interest h =[ {(ci,v i)i=1,2 ,λ
0,K0],
let T b ean o n - l i n e a ro p e r a t o rs u c ht h a tT[hWV] satisﬁes the equilibrium system
of equations and the participation constraints. The solution to our problem is then
a ﬁxed point of T, i.e., a vector [hWV ] such that [hWV ]=T[hWV ]. To
approximate the ﬁxed point, we follow the steps below.




Step 2: For each iteration n ≥ 1, use the previous guess [hn−1 Wn−1 Vn−1] to
compute the new vector [hn Wn Vn] that satisﬁes the equilibrium conditions.
H e r e ,w eh a v et om a k es u r et h a tt h ep a r t i c i p a t i o nc o n s t r a i n t sa r es a t i s ﬁed, that
is, Wn( ,λn,K n,z) ≥ Vn( ,λn,K n,z).
Step 3:U s e[hn Wn Vn] as the next initial guess and iterate until [hn Wn Vn] con-
verges.
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33Appendix 3: Figures
Figure 1: Next Period Wealth Distribution (λ
0) as a Function of λ and  


































































































































































34Figure 2: Optimal Consumption (c1) as a Function of λ and  




































35Figure 3: Next Period Capital Stock (K0) as a Function of λ and  






























































36Figure 4: Optimal Consumption (c1) as a Function of a1 and  




























37Figure 5: Next Period Capital Stock (K0) as a Function of a1 and  















































38Figure 6: Welfare Loss in the Competitive Equilibrium in Consumption Equivalent (%) Terms as a Function of a1
and  








































































39Figure 7: Next Period Wealth Distribution (λ
0) as a Function of λ and  

































































40Figure 8: Next Period Capital Stock (K0) from Time Series Simulations
























Aggregate Capital Accumulation in a Long Run Simulation
























Aggregate Capital Accumulation Along the Business Cycle
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41Figure 9: Average Life-Time Utility (W1) from Time Series Simulations
0 50 100 150
−2.95
−2.94
−2.93
−2.92
−2.91
−2.9
−2.89
−2.88
−2.87
−2.86
Time
L
i
f
e
 
T
i
m
e
 
U
t
i
l
i
t
y
no autarky effects
42